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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-RIGHT OF CREDITORS OF A
DECEDENT TO RECOVER FROM D1sTRIBUTEEs AFTER THE EsTATE Is
CLOSED-A recent California decision suggests a problem of some difficulty in the administration of decedents' estates. In Dabney 'V. Dabney/ it appeared that a decedent had, in hisJifetime, contracted to pay
the plaintiff $mo and $350 respectively, monthly, as long as plaintiff
should live, according to the terms of two contracts. In distributing the
estate the court, as provided in the California Probate Code,2 had set
aside a sum of money for the purpose of paying these monthly installments. The estate was then distributed, defendant herein being the
1 (Cal. App. 1942) 129 P. (2d) 470.
For an earlier decision involving the
same case, see Dabney v. Dabney, 9 Cal. App. 665, 51 P. (2d) 108 (1935).
2 Cal. Probate Code (Deering, 1941), § 953, provides that the amount of a claim
not due or contingent "or such part of the same as the holder would be entitled to if
the claim were due, established or absolute, must be paid into court and there remain,
to be paid over to the party when he becomes entitled thereto...."
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principal distributee. On February r7, I94I, there remained only $2r6
of the original fund for the payment of these installments. Plaintiff
thereupon brought this action against defendant as the principal distributee of the estate to recover the unpaid amount of her claim. Reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, the court held that the determination of the probate court in allowing claims of this sort and in making
distribution was final, and could not be attacked in an action such as
this. In its opinion, the court said:
" ... The authorities cited by plaintiff as sanctioning such an
action, and others which have come to our notice, appear to fall
mainly in one of three classes; first, those applying to land or
other property which, under the probate system of the jurisdiction, was not subject to administration; second, those involving
contingent claims which could not, under the applicable provisions
of law, be presented to the personal representative before distribution of the estate; and third, those based on a special statute authorizing such an action." 8
This case squarely presents the question: Under what circumstances,
if any, can a creditor proceed against distributees to recover his claim
against a decedent after the estate is closed? If, as here, the claim has
been presented in the probate proceeding, the answer does not ordinarily involve serious difficulty. The California court would seem to
be entirely correct in concluding that the decision of the probate court
is final as to the claim, and that, unless the probate proceeding can be
reopened, the distributed assets of the estate cannot be reached. 4 Indeed, in this situation, unless there has been a mistake or misapplication
of the funds by the personal representative or the probate court, it is
hard to see how any question of liability of distributees could arise.
A much more difficult aspect of the problem is presented, however,
in a case where the claim has not been filed with, nor passed upon by,
the probate court. In this situation, a considerable number of cases and
statutes recognize a liability of distributees to creditors after the decedent's estate is closed. This aspect of the problem is the subject of the
discussion which follows.

I.
That there is a possible basis for the liability of distributees in the
doctrines of law and equity cannot be doubted. Indeed, as the law of
Dabney v. Dabney, (Cal. App. 1942) 129 P. (2d) 470 at 471-472.
The decree of distribution is declared by statute to be conclusive as to heirs,
devisees and legatees. Cal. Probate Code (Deering, 1941), § 1021.
8

4
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administration of decedents' estates developed_ in England,5 it was
natural that such liability should be recognized. There were no nonclaim statutes.6 Until equity worked out a method of publishing notice
to creditors and requiring all to come in or be barred, there was no way
of telling when all the creditors had been ascertained. The office of
executor or administrator continued after the estate was closed.7 Action
on creditor's claims could be brought against such officers in the common-law courts. On the other hand, real estate did not normally come
into the hands of the executor or administrator at all, but· title passed
directly to the heir or devisee; and unless the law worked out some
procedure by which it could be reached in the hands of the heir or
devisee, it could not be reached by creditors at all.8
From very early #mes, the dqctrine that the personal representative could make legatees refund was recognized. Even in the first
Statute of Distribution of I 670, express provision was made, allowing
the personal representative to require the next of kin to give a refunding bond.9
It must not be supposed, however, that the English common law
regarded the heir or the distributee 10 as becoming the debtor in place
of the decedent, as did the Roman law. In English law, it was the
executor or administrator, and not the distribute\'!, who stepped into the
shoes of the decedent, for the purpose of liability on the latter's debts,11
and even this liability was normally limited to assets received as personal estate of the decedent.
The liability of the distributee would seem to have two di:ff erent
bases. First, the creditor might be able to recover in an action against
5 For general discussion of administration of estates in equity under English law,
see MAITLAND, EQUITY, Brunyate rev. ed., 248-276· (1936); LANGDELL, BRIEF SuRVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION, 2d ed., 125-191 (1908). And see 2 WOERNER,
AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., c. 40 (1923), on the payment of debts
at common law.
6 22 & 2 3 Viet., c. 3 5 ( I 8 5 9) protected personal representatives who gave notice.
But this statute expressly provided that nothing contained in _it should prevent er.editors from pursuing the assets in the hands of distributees. See 2 WILLIAMS, ExEcuTORs, 12th ed., 880-883 (1930).
·
7 3 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW oF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed.,§ 571 (1923).
8 LANGDELL, BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION, 2d ed., 145 (1908).
9 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, § 8 (1670). "It may be here mentioned that the old
practice of the Court of Chancery was, that the legatee should in all .cases give the
executor security to refund, if debts should afterwards appear. Afterwards the <:;ourt
ceased to require such security; and since then creditors have been allowed to follow
assets in the hands of legatees, as well as of the executor." 2 WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS,
12th ed., 878 (1930).
In general as to the right of a creditor to compel a legatee to refund, see id. 986.
10 As used herein, the term distributee includes a person who receives land by
testate or intestate succession as well as one who receives personalty.
11 LANGDELL, BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION, 2d ed., 129-131 (1908).
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the distributee of a particular kind of property, such as an interest in
land, because this was the only way to subject that kind of property to
the claims of creditors at all. Thus, under the English law, the executor or administrator had nothing to do with the land of the decedent,
and title passed directly to the heir or devisee. At one time, indeed,
creditors of the decedent could not reach his land at all, unless he had
executed a covenant on behalf of his heirs as well as himself.12 But a
statute enacted in 1691 18 was designed to hold both the heir anq. the
devisee liable for specialty debts of the decedent to the extent of assets
received. Today, of course, land is everywhere liable for the debts of
the decedent. But we still find statutes, under which distributees are
held, which approach the problem from the standpoint of the English
statute of 1691, and appear to be designed to create a liability for the
debt against a particular kind of property.14
The second, and by far the more common, basis of liability of the
distributee is unjust enr.ichment. As was aptly said many years ago by
the late Professor Joseph Warren: 15
"The right of the creditor to proceed directly against the
beneficiary seems entirely defensible both at law and in equity,
despite his alternative right to hold the personal representative for
a devastavit. The legatee holds without consideration what is
equitably due the creditor; he is unjustly enriched at the latter's
expense."
Although the creditor's claim is not usually regarded as a lien on the
property which the distributee has received, the extent of the creditor's
Id. 145.
3 & 4 Wm. & Mary, c. 14 (1691).
14 See, for example, Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1935), c. 59, § II and following, referred to later on in this discussion.
15 Warren, "Problems in Probate and Administration," 32 HARV. L. REV. 315
at 334 (1919).
·
A passage from Story, sometimes cited in the cases, is to the effect that no action
at law would lie against the legatees, but no authorities are cited by Story in support
of that proposition. The passage is as follows: "Another illustration of implied trusts
may be found in the common case of a suit in equity by a creditor of an estate to
recover his debt from legatees or distributees who have received payment of their
claims from the executor (acting by mistake but bona .fide and without fault) before
a due discharge of all the debts. In such a case the executor who has so distributed the
assets may be sued at law by the creditor. But the legatees and distributees, although
there was an original deficiency of assets, are not at law suable by the creditor. Yet
he has a clear right in equity, in such a case, to follow the assets of the testator into
their hands as a trust fund for the payment of his debts. The legatees and distributees
are in equity treated as trustees for this purpose; for they are not entitled to anything
except the surplus of the assets after all the debts are paid." 2 STORY, EQUITY JumsPRUDENCE, 13th ed., § 1251 (1886).
12
18

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

recovery is limited by the amount of the distributee's enrichment. In
most jurisdictions at the present time this remedy in favor of a creditor
who has not filed his claim in· the probate proceedings exists after the
settlement of the estate only to collect claims which could not have
been asserted in. the probate proceedings.16 And, in many states, the
only contract claims which could not have been asserted in the probate
proceedings are contingent claims. Thus, the problem herein considered resolves itself pretty largely into a question of the recovery on
contingent claims after the settlement of the estate. Indeed, most of
the cases involving the problem deal with claims of three kinds: (1)
liability on a covenant of warranty in a deed of conveyance; ( 2) liability of a surety or guarantor; and (3) statutory liability of the stockholder of an insolvent corporation.
2.

It is not possible, however, to determine the liability of the distributee today by a mere examination of doctrines of the common law
and of equity. Modern legislation has tended more and more to provide for a final adjudication in the probate proceedings of all claims
of whatsoever character, and has thus reduced to a minimum, or in
some jurisdictions eliminated altogether, any postprobate liability of
the distributee. On the other hand, other legislation expressly provides
that the distributee is to be liable under certain circumstances. It is
necessary, therefore, to consider what legislation now in force may tend
to eliminate or to fix the liability of the distributee.
Before taking up the law of particular jurisdictions, it should be
noted that the liability of distributees after the estate is closed could
conceivably be regarded as precluded by three types of modern statutes:
(I) the nonclaim statutes; ( 2) statutes providing for a specific order
of distribution in the nature of a final judgment disposing of the real
and personal property of the estate; (3) statutes providing for the
discharge of executors and administrators.
As to nonclaim statutyS, it is generally held that they operate to
bar all claims which, by the terms of such statutes, creditors are required
to file in the course of administration.11 Indeed, even where a creditor
failed through no fault of his to present a claim which the law provided
should be presented, it was held that no action would lie against distributees, since it could not be said that they were unjustly enriched.18
16 Sawyer v. Jeffs, 70 N.H. 393, 47 A. 416 (i900); Woods v. Ely, 7 S.D. 471,
64 N.W. 531 (1895); 3 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed.,
§ 577 (1923); ATKINSON, WILLS, 751 (1937); L.R.A. 1916A u85. And see
Fowler v. True, 76 Maine 43 (1884). But see N.Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1939) § 170, quoted infra, at note 72.
17 ATKINSON, WILLS 653-659 (1937); and see note 16, supra.
18 American University v. Forbes, 88 N.H. 17, 183 A. 860 (1936).
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But nonclaim statutes do not bar claims which the law does not permit to be presented in the administration proceedings, and, unless the
statutes provide otherwise, contingent claims are not barred.
Second, it may be asked, following the reasoning of the California
case already discussed, why may we not conclude, in any jurisdiction
where the decree of distribution is in the form of a final judgment, that
this decree is binding as to all claims whether they could have been
filed or not? In other words, why does not this type of decree of distribution preclude any liability of distributees thereafter? The answer
in most jurisdictions would seem to be this: if the claim could not be
filed, then it is not involved as an issue in making the decree of distribution, and that decree does not decide that the distributee is free
from it. Certainly, as a general proposition, no one would say that liens
and other claims against the property, as distinguished from personal
liabilities of the decedent, are extinguished by the decree of distribution. For if that were true, then the probate proceeding would in effect
be a quiet title action. Just so, it would seem that claims of creditors
which could not be put in issue in the probate proceeding are not barred
by the decree of distribution.
Third, why does not the discharge of the executor or administrator
extinguish all claims which could not have been theretofore asserted?
The argument would run thus: There can be no debt without a debtor;
if the claim is one which survives, we can sue the personal representative; and in England, where the distribution of the estate did not
terminate the office of executor or administrator, presumably, creditors
could sue him as long as he lived. Hence there was some point in saying that the distributee was unjustly enriched, for there was a debtor
{ to wit, the personal representative) who would have been able to pay
had not the funds of the estate passed to the distributee. But, if the
personal representative be discharged before a contingent claim becomes
absolute, then there never was a debtor, and ~o, never a debt; hence the
distributee is not unjustly enriched. Suffice it to say that no such argument as the foregoing has been found _in the decided cases. In at least
one jurisdiction it appears that there must be a liability of the personal
representative before the distributee can be sued; 19 but in that jurisdiction, it also appears that the English doctrine, to the effect that the
closing of the estate does not necessarily discharge the personal representative, is followed. 20
Let us now consider the effect of particular statutes. While no attempt will be made to deal comprehensively with all of them, legisla19 See Brinkworth v. Hazlett, 64 Neb. 592, 90 N. W. 537 (1902); Hazlett v.
Blakely's Estate, 70 Neb. 613, 97 N.W. 808 (1903); Parker v. Luehrmann, 126
Neb. 1, 252 N.W. 402 (1934).
20 In re Estate of Bolton, 121 Neb. 737, 238 N.W. 358 (1931).
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tive provisions in most jurisdictions can be classified roughly under on~
or more of the following heads: (r) nonclaim statutes which purport
to terminate all claims;_ (2) nonclaim statutes which require the filing
of all claims arising upon contract, whether due, not due or contingent;
(3) special statutory provisions for the satisfaction of contingent or
other exceptional claims; ( 4) special statutory provisions for the liability of distributees, or of particular classes of distributees such as heirs
and devisees.
In several states, the nonclaim ~tatutes are of such broad and sweeping character that they appear to extinguish all claims of creditors, ·and
thus to leave no room for any doctrine of refunding by distributees after the closing of probate. Thus in Florida, the following statute,21
enacted in 1933, as a part of the probate code,22 would seem to have
that effect:
"No claim or demand, whether due or not, direct or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, or claim for personal property in
the possession of the personal representative or for damages, shall
be valid or binding upon an estate or upon the personal representative thereof, or upon any heir, legatee, or devisee of the- decedent unless the same shall be in writing. . . and be filed in the
office of the county judge granting letters. Any such claim or demand not so filed within eight months from the time of the first
publication of the notice to creditors shall be void even though the
personal representative has recognized such claim or demand by
paying a portion thereof or interest thereon or otherwise; provided, however, that the lien of any duly recorded mortgage and
the lien of any person in possession of personal property and the
right to foreclose and enforce such mortgage or lien shall not be
impaired or affected by failure ~o file claim or demand as hereinabove provided, but such failure shall bar the right to enforce any
personal liability against the estate, and the claimant shall be limited to the enforcement of the mortgage or lien against the specific
property so mortgaged or held ...."
Although there is no express provision barring claims against distributees, such as appears in th~ Florida statute, it would seem that the
Fla. Stat. (1941), § 733.16.
Fla. Gen. Laws (1933), c. 16103, § 120. Probably the law of Florida was
otherwise prior to the enactment of this legislation. See Henderson v. First Trust &
Sav. Bank, 107 Fla. 212, 144 So. 415 (1932), and Clifton v. Clifton, 54 Fla. 535,
45 So. 458 (1907), recognizing that the personal representative may compel the
distributee to refund:
21

22
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following Kansas statute,23 enacted as a part of its probate code of 1939,
would have that effect:
"All demands, including demands of the state, against a decedent's estate, whether due or to become due, whether absolute
or contingent, including any demand arising from or out of any
statutory liability of decedent or on account of or arising from any
liability as surety, guarantor, or indemnitor, and including the
individual demands of executors and administrators, not exhibited
as required by this act within nine months a~er the date of the
first published notice to creditors as herein provided, shall be forever barred from payment: Provided: That the provisions of the
testator's will requiring the payment of a demand exhibited later
shall control. No creditor shall have any claim against or lien
upon the property of a decedent other than liens existing at the
date of his death, unless an executor or administrator of his estate
has been appointed within one year after the death of the decedent, and such creditor shall have exhibited his demand in the
manner and within the time herein prescribed...."
In Colorado, an amendment to the nonclaim statute enacted in

1941,24 would seem to bar "all claims, including unmatured and contingent claims" which are not filed in the probate proceeding.
The present New Mexico nonclaim statute 25 provides that "All
claims against the estates of deceased persons not filed and notice given,
as provided in the preceding section, within six months from the date of
the first publication of notice of the appointment of the executor or
administrator, shall be barred."
While this statute does not expressly refer to claims which are contingent or which are not due, it would appear from another section of
28 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1941), § 59-2239. The next section, namely § 592240, provides for allowing demands not due and permits distributees to give a refunding bond. Sec. 59-2241 provides for the hearing and determination of contingent claims. Prior to the probate code, it was held that a creditor could assert a contingent claim against a distributee. Rohrbaugh v. Hamblin, 57 Kan. 393, 46 P. 705
(1896), an action on a covenant of warranty, brought several years after the estate
was settled.
24 Colo. Laws (1941), c. 235, § 24, amending Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935), c. 176,
§ 207. But see Colo. Stat. Ann (1935), c. 179, § 225, which permits the executor or
administrator to require a refunding bond of the distributee and provides for suit on it
''When at any time after the payment of legacies or distributive shares it shall become
necessary that the same, or any part thereof, be refunded for the payment of debts."
25 N.M. Stat. (1941), § 33-803, Laws (1937), c. 136, § 1, and Laws (1933),
c. 173, § I.
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the New Mexico statutes 26 that claims which are not yet due or are
contingent should be filed. Indeed, the nonclaim statute which appears
in the annotated statutes of l 929 would seem to be just as effective to
bar claims as the statute in its present form. It is probable that this
statute does operate to bar claims against distributees after the estate is
settled.
In Delaware, the form of the nonclaim statute enacted in 1939 27
probably has an effect similar to the statutes already referred to. It
provides for a notice to creditors to be given by the register, and then
continues to the effect that
"If the Register shall observe the requirements of the first
paragraph of this section, all claims against the estate of the decedent, whether due, not due or contingent, and including any
claim on a bond secured by a mortgage on real estate, not presented to such executor or administrator ... and of which he shall
not have notice as provided in Section 41 of this Chapter, within
one year after the date of the granting of letters to such executor
or administrator shall be forever barred."
It seems clear that this provision coupled with the provisions of the
statute as to distribution,2 8 would operate to bar all claims against distributees of personalty. For the latter statute provides for a decree of
distribution by the Orphans Court which shall, if not appealed from, be
"conclusive and binding upon the executor or administrator of the
estate of the decedent and upon every person claiming to have an interest in the estate thereby distributed." But both these statutes are in the
chapter of the code on "Settlement of Personal Estate" and do not
purport to deal with realty. However, the statute which provides a
special proceeding to reach real estate of the decedent to satisfy debts,29
requires first a judgment against the personal representative. Hence,
it would appear that real estate might not be reached if the claim had
not been presented in the usual way; but, if it had, it is possible that
land could be reached for debts after the settlement of the estate in the
Orphans Court.
The Wisconsin legislation of 1933 so would seem to place that state
in the class with those jurisdictions which bar contingent claims by the
26 N. M. Stat. (1941}, § 33-813. And see Tierney v. Shakespeare, 34 N. M.
501, 284 P. 1019 (1930).
27 Del. Laws (1939), c. 142, amending Del. Rev. Code (1935), c. 98, §§ 63
and 41.
28 Del. Laws (1939), c. 143, amending Del. Rev. Code (1<>35), c. 98, § 69.
29 Del. Rev. Code (1935), c. 99, § 2.
30 Wis. Stat. (1941), §§ 313.08 and 313.22, enacted as a part of Wis. Laws
(1933), c. 190.
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nonclaim statute. Prior to that time, the statute provided that contingent claims may be filed, but it now provides that "Contingent claims
against a decedent's estate which cannot be allowed as debts shall, nevertheless be presented to the court a~d proved...." The revisers' note
indicates that the statute was designed to bar contingent claims in the
nonclaim period.81 But if the claim is filed, then the statute expressly
provides for the liability of distributees after it becomes absolute.
In view of decisions as to the claims which are barred by its nonclaim statute, it would seem that the e:ffect of the Washington legislation is much the same as that of Wisconsin with respect to the liability
of distributees. 82 A similar interpretation might well be placed upon
the Michigan legislation, but that is reserved for subsequent discussion
in view of the rather elaborate provisions about the liability of distributees.
The only group of statutes on this subject which show any real
semblance of uniformity consists of several of those included in the
second classification already suggested. The California statute,88 which
is probably the model for this group, provides that
"All claims arising upon contract, whether they are due, not
due, or contingent, and all claims for funeral expenses, must be
filed or presented within the time limited in the notice or as extended by the provisions of section 702 of this code; and any claim
not so filed or presented is barred forever, unless it is made to
appear by the affidavit of the claimant to the satisfaction of the
court or a judge thereof that the claimant had not received notice
81
The note to Wis. Stat. (1933), § 313.08, is in part as follows: "This section
is amended to bar all claims (including contingent claims) not filed. Section 313.22
et seq. are amended to provide for proving and listing all contingent liabilities so that
provision may be made for them and so that heirs and legatees may know of such
liabilities. This change does away with troublesome disputes as to whether a claim
is contingent or absolute."
82
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932), §§ 1477, 1484, bar claims which
have not been presented, there being no express reference to contingent claims. To
the effect that contingent claims must be filed, see Seattle Trust Co. v. Zbinden, 170
Wash. 692, 17 P. (2d) 629 (1932); Barto v. Stewart, 21 Wash. 605, 59 P. 480 (1899).
But Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1547, provides that a creditor may
have an action for contribution against a distributee if the claim has been presented.
88
Cal. Probate Code (Deering, 1941), § 707. The earlier form of the statute
appears in Kerr's Codes of California (1907) as§ 1493 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and appears to have been enacted in 1872. It is as follows: "All claims arising upon
contracts whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, must be presented within
the time limited in the notice, and any claim not so presented is barred forever;
provided, however, that when it is made to appear by the affidavit of the claimant,
to the satisfaction of the court, or a judge thereof, that the claimant had no notice as
provided in this chapter by reason of being out of the state, it may be presented at any
time before a decree of distribution is entered."
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by being out of the state, in which event it may be filed or presented at any time before a decree of distribution is rendered."
Language similar to this is found in the statutes of Arizona,84 Idaho,85
Montana,86 North Dakota,87 Oklahoma,38 South Dakota,39 Utah,4° and
Wyoming.41 One might infer that these statutes, also, would operate
to bar all claims asserted against distributees after the settlement of the
estate. And this conclusion might be strengthened by a statute found
in California,42 copied apparently in some of the other states in this
group,4 3 which provides that the decree of distribution is "conclusive
as to the rights of heirs, devisees an1 legatees." On the other hand, it
is clear that there are claims against a decedent which cannot be said to
"arise upon contract," and they are not included in such statutes.44 In
34

Ariz. Code Ann. (1939), § 38-1003, substantially same as earlier California

statute.
85 Idaho Code Ann. ( 193 2), § I 5-604, substantially sa~e as earlier California
statute. But to the effect that distributees may be followed as to claims not arising
on contract, see Madison v. Buhl, 51 Idaho 564, 8 P. (2d) 271 (1932), involving
liability on a guardian's bond which the court said was a statutory liability and not one
arising on contract.
86 Mont. Rev. Codes (1935), § 10173, like earlier California statute, but with
minor additions.
87 N.D. Comp. Laws (Supp., 1925), § 8544a10, same as N.D. Laws (1925),
c. l 20, § l O.
,
,
88 Okla. Stat. (1941), tit. 58, § 333, provides that "All claims arising upon
contracts hereafter made, whether the same be due, not aue or contingent, must be
presented within the time limited in the notice; and any claim not so presented is
barred forever•••." An earlier clause in the same section provides "If a claim arising
upon a contract heretofore made be not presented within the time limited in the notice,
it is barred forever, except as follows . . . ." Then the statute sets out an exception to
the effect that a claim not due or contingent may be presented "within one month after
it becomes due or absolute." It has been held that this exc~ption applies only to contracts "heretofore made," that is, contracts made before the statute Was enacted. See
Timmons v. Hanna Constr. Co., 176 Okla. 180, 55 P. (2d) IIO (1936); Fluke v.
Douglas, 158 Okla. 300, 13 P. (2d) 210 (1932); Spruill v. Reserve Loan Life Ins.
Co., (D. C. Okla. 1938) 21 F. Supp. 889, reversing earlier cases' which construed
this clause as having larger scope. But see Harmon v. Nofire, 131 Okla. 1, 267 P. 650
(1928), the rule of which appears to be unmodified in later hearings of the same
case in Harmon v. Hines, 160 Okla. 120, 16 P. (2d) 94 (1932), and Hines v. Harmon, 178 Okla. 1, 61 P. (2d) 641 (1936).
89 S. D. Code (1939), § 35.1404.
40 Utah Code Ann. (1943), § 102-9-4.
41 Wyo. Rev. Stat. (193:i:), § 88-3103.
42 Cal. Probate Code (Deering, 1941), § 1021.
43 See, for example, Ariz. Code Ann. (1939), § 38-1322; Idaho Code Ann.
(1932), § 15-1307; Utah Code-Ann. (1943), § 102-9-28.
44 See the note in 12 So. CAL. L. REv. 430 (1939) as to claims on which suit
may be brought against the executor or administrator, but which need not be presented.
In Madison v. Buhl, 51 Idaho 564, 8 P. (2d) 271 (1932), it appears that as to some
claims which do not arise on contract the distributees may be liable.
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some of these states it has been expressly held that contingent claims
which are not presented in the probate proceeding are barred.45 But in
Nathan v. Freeman,4 6 the Montana Supreme Court held that conditional covenants by a lessee to pay taxes and to replace the floor of a
building on request of the lessor, which were not broken until the nonclaim period with respect to the settlement of the lessee's estate had
expired, were not within the statute of nonclaim. Referring to the California case which took the opposite view, Justice Galen said: "There is
no way on earth by which the happening of the event could have been
anticipated, nor by which the possibility of its occurrence could have
been foreseen .... We cannot and will not give indorsement to such a
construction of the statute." And in Baird v. McMillan,4 1 the North
Dakota Supreme Court indicated that the nonclaim statute should not
apply to a contingent claim of such a character that the contingency was
as to the person who would have the claim. The case involved the
statutory liability of the stockholder of an insolvent corporation, and
the court said: "The statute does not seem to contemplate a situation
where, owing to the nature of the liability, there is no person in existence capable of presenting the claim." But in Johnson v. Larson 48 the
same court said that contingent claims are within the nonclaim statute,
and failed to state any exception.
Probably the present Alabama nonclaim statute 49 should be classed
with the group of states just considered, although its legislation is quite
differently worded.
It should be observed that, in at least one state, namely Oregon,5°
45 Verdier v. Roach, 96 Cal. 467, 31 P. 554 (1892), Johnson v. Larson, 56 N.D.
207, 216 N.W. 895 (1928); Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258
P. 342 (1927). See, also, Dallas Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. Brooder, 55 Wyo.
109, 97 P. (2d) 3II (1939).
46
70 Mont. 259 at 271, 225 P. 1015 (1924).
47
53 N. D. 257 at 260, 205 N. W. 682 (1925).
48
56 N. D. 207, 216 N. W. 895 (1927).
49 Ala. Code (1940), tit. 61, §§ 210, 2II, requires the presentation of "All
claims against the estate of a decedent • . • whether due or to become due" and, in
general, bars them if not presented in the six months period. The statute does not
mention contingent claims, but since an earlier form of statute did not require the
filing of contingent claims, it is possible that this form of legislation was designed to
include them. See North Birmingham American Bank v. White, 225 Ala. 72, 142
So. 47 (1932).
Ala. Code (1940), tit. 61, § 212, extends the time for filing claims by a
minor or person of unsound mind to "six months after the removal of their respective
disabilities." In such exceptional cases, it might well be held that the creditor could
sue a distributee.
50 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940), § I<)-702, required the presentation of contingent claims. But see §§ 9-701 to 9-717 as to liability of legatees, devisees and
heirs. These provisions resemble New York legislation. See note 72 infra.
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contingent claims must be :filed in probate, but are not barred by the
nonclaim statute nor ·by the settlement of the estate, because the statute
expressly provides otherwise. Probably the same situation exists in
Iowa. 51
'
The third kind of provisions to be considered is that which involves
· legislation making special provision for contingent or other unusual
claims. Of course, statutes preserving the lien of a mortgage after the
period of the nonclaim statute has expired are common. But this is not,
strictly speaking, the preservation of a debt of the decedent, but rather
of an interest in property which he has created, and is therefore beyond
the scope of this discussion. Indeed, it may well be assumed that such
lien would be preserved whether the statutes expressly so provided or
not.
Statutes which deal with contingent claims in a special manner are,
in general, of two sorts. First, there is the statute like the California
legislation already referred to,52 which requires or permits the filing of
contingent claims in the probate proceeding, but which also provides
that a fund be set aside to pay such claims. Statutes of this sort are
found in a large number of states,53 including several of the jurisdictions already referred to. Sometimes the provision as to the retention
of a fund for contingent or other claims which are not due is compulsory; sometimes it is said that the court may retain such a fund. It
would seem that provisions for the retention of a fund to pay contingent
claims does not in any way indicate that distributees would be held
liable on such claims, but rather the contrary. In several of these states,
however, are found statutes to the effect' that, if a claim is presented
and rejected, suit may be brought on it within a brief period of time
51

Iowa Code (1939), § 11927, as amended by Iowa Gen. Acts (1941), c. 301,
would seem to bar all claims not filed "as hereinbefore provided," "unless peculiar
circumstances entitle the claimant to equitable relief." Iowa Code ( I 93 9), §§ l I 964,
11965, require the filing of contingent claims and claims not due. Yet in spite of
these statutes, it seems probable that a creditor may sometimes recover against a distributee on a contingent claim. See Iowa Code (1939), § 12060; McClure v. Dee,
115 Iowa 546, 88 N. W. 1093 (1902); Andrew v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 219 Iowa
1244, 260 N.W. 849 (1935); Luce v. Thompson, (C.C.A. 8th, 1929) 36 F. (2d)
183; 22 lowA L. REv. 763 (1937).
52 See note 2, supra.
58 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939), § 38-1320; Cal-. Probate Code (Deering, 1941),
§ 9 53; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1942), c. I 76, § 207; Idaho Cod~ Ann. ( I 93 2), § 15-n29; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1942), § 27.3178 (436); Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. (1935), § 10312; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 30-701; N. D. Comp. Laws
Ann. (1913), § 8761; Okla. Stat. (1941), tit. 58, § 596; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1940), §19-no8; S. D. Code (1939), § 35-1429; Utah Code Ann. (1943),
§ 102-9-26; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932), § 1549; W. Va. Code
(1937), § 4163; Wis. Stat. (1941), § 313.22; Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931), § 88-2806.
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(generally two or three months) after such claim becomes due. 54 This
would seem to indicate that perhaps distributees might be sued if the
claim were presented and recovery was had under these statutes.
The second sort of statute as to contingent or unmatured claims is
·that which permits the creditor to sue at any time within a short period
after the claim becomes due, whether he has filed his claim or not. 55
The Connecticut statute as to solvent estates 56 illustrates this variety of
statute. It provides: "· .. when a right of action shall accrue after the
time limited for the presentation of claims, it shall be exhibited within
four months after such right of action shall accrue and shall be paid out
of the estate remaining after the payment of the debts exhibited within
the time limited." Indeed, in jurisdictions where statutes of this variety
have been enacted, one sometimes finds decisions permitting recovery
against distributees on such claims.57 Very commonly these statutes are
coupled with express provisions fixing the liability of distributees, and
therefore some of them will be referred to in that connection.
The fourth class of statutory provisions includes a rather heterogeneous group of statutes having the common element of an express
declaration of the liability of distributees. Before taking up some of
these by way of illustration; two kinds of statutes should be noted. Following an old New York statute, a few states have legislation to the
effect that lineal heirs and devisees of warrantors are liable "in the
cases and in the manner prescribed by law." 58 It is believed that this
legislation adds nothing to the liability of distributees otherwise existing, and was merely enacted to indicate that, aside from the abolition
of lineal and collateral warranties, liabilities of heirs and devisees were
unaffected by this statute. 59
H Ariz. Code Ann. (1939), § 38-1007; Cal. Probate Code (Deering, 1941),
§ 714; Idaho Code Ann. (1932), § 15-609; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (1935), § 10178
as amended by Laws (1939), c. 192; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, §2u as amended by N. Y.
Laws (1938),c. 446. Okla. Stat. (1941), tit. 58, § 339; S. D. Code (1939), § 35.1417;
Utah Code Ann. (1943), § 102-9-9; Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931), § 88-3107.
55 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), § 4914; Maine Rev. Stat. (1930), c. IOI, §§ 1618; Neb. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp., 1941), § 30-704; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926), c.
304, § 20, Rev. Laws (1942), c. 357, § 20; Ohio Gen. Code, (Page 1938), §§ 10509216 to 10509-223; R. I. Gen. Laws (1938), c. 578, § 42; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933),
§§ 2940 to 2950. As to this last statute, see Kreichman v. Webster, I IO Vt. 105,
2 A. (2d) 199 (1938). See also, Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 197, § 13.
56 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), § 4914.
57 See State ex rel. McClure v. Northrop, 93 Conn. 558, 106 A. 504 (1919);
Johnson v. Libby, III Me. 204, 88 A. 647 (1913).
58 See N. Y. Real Property Law (McKinney, 1937), § 252; Cal. Civ. Code
(Deering, 1941), § III5; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), § 56-114; Idaho Code
Ann. (1932), § 54-614; S. D. Code (1939), § 51.1414.
59 See Woods v. Ely, 7 S. D. 471, 64 N. W. 531 (1895); Hill v. Ressegieu, 17
Barb. (N. Y.) 162 (1852).
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Several states have express provisions permitting the executor or
administrator to require a refunding bond of the distributee. 60 Presumably, if the distributee gives such a bond, he is liable on it according to
its terms; but that does not help us much in determining his liability
in the absence of contract.
In Illinois, claims that are "not due," as those that are due, must be
filed and if not filed they are barred.01 But this provision is held not
to permit the filing of contingent claims.62 Some of the sections of the
Illinois Statute of Frauds and Perjuries 68 are designed to impose an
express liability on heirs and devisees, and appear to be modeled after
the English statute of r69I. 64 Since this Illinois statute does not impose liability on ·distributees of personalty, the question has arisen
whether it is exclusive or whether common-law doctrines of personalty
are still in force. There is authority for the proposition that the common-law liability of distributees of personalty to refund for contingent
claims still exists.65
In Indiana, where the statute provides for the liability of distributees under very limited circumstances,66 the most recent decisions are to
the effect that the statute is exclusive and no common-law liability of
distributees exists.61
In Michigan 68 it appears that all contingent claims must be filed,
but that if they subsequently beco!Jle due they are then to be filed
again; and if the estate is insufficient to pay them, the creditor may
proceed against the distributees. It would seem from the language of
the statute, that this right to proceed.against the distributees is limited
60 These statutes are in a variety of forms.
Some allow the personal representative or the court to require a refunding bond in all cases before distribution. See Ark.
Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937), § 216; Ky. Civ. Code Pi-act. (Carroll-Baldwin, 1938),
§ 435; Va. Code (1942), § 5365. Or, as in the case of the Michigan statute, the
refunding bond is required if the distributee wishes his share before a final closing
of the estate. Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1942) § 27.3178 (167).
·
61 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 3, §§ 345, 356.
62 See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Corporation of Fine Arts Bldg., 288 Ill. 142,
123 N.E. 300 (1919).
68 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 59, § II et seq.
64 3 & 4 Wm. & Mary, c. 14 (1691), supra, note 13.
65 See Groesbeck v. Beaupre, 307 Ill. App. 215, 30 N.E. (2d) 531 (1940),
discussed in 29 Ill. B. J. 475 (1941).
.
66 Ind. Stat. Ann (Burns, 1933), § 6-1901, imposes a liability on distributees to
any creditor whose claim remains unpaid, who, six months prior to the final settlement,
was insane, an infant or out of the state; but such suit must be brought one year
after the disability is removed, and the out-of-state creditor must sue within two years
after final settlement.
61 Clevenger v. Matthews, 165 Ind. 689, 76 N. E. 542 (1906). This case overrules earlier decisions to the contrary.
68 The subject of contingent claims, including the liability of distributees, is dealt
with in Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1942), §§ 27.3178(435) to 27.3178(447).
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to claims that have been filed in probate. But a recent decision 69 on an
earlier form of the statute contains a statement to the effect that this
statute applies only to the assertion of claims during probate. In view of
this and some earlier Michigan cases recognizing the liability of distributees where claims were not filed, the matter is not free from
doubt. 70
In New Yark, the Surrogate's Court Act 71 provides that the holder
of a contingent claim "has a right to file with the executor or administrator" a notice of his claim, and as to claims not presented within the
time fixed in the notice to creditors, "The executor or administrator
shall not be chargeable for any assets or moneys that he may have
paid...." But this does not bar an action against distributees, the liability of which is provided for in the New Yark Decedent Estate Law.12
Section r70 thereof provides as follows:
"An action may be maintained, as prescribed in this article,
against the surviving husband or wife of a decedent, and the next
of kin of an intestate, and the next of kin or legatees of a testator
to recover, to the extent of the assets paid or distributed to them,
for a debt of the decedent, upon which an action might have been
maintained, against the executor or administrator. The neglect of
the creditor to present his claim to the executor or adminisp-ator,
within the time prescribed by law for that purpose, does not impair his right to maintain such an action."
Then follow various sections detailing the character of the liability
of various classes of distributees. Heirs and devisees are liable only
"for the funeral expenses and debts of the decedent, arising by simple
contract or by specialty, to the extent of the estate, interest, and right
69 Schutz v. Reai:l, 284 Mich. 548, 280 N.W. 45 (1938).
That was a case of
a statutory liability on corporate stock which the court regarded as like an expense of
administration and not a debt of the decedent. Recovery against distributees was
allowed, although the claim was not filed. At that time, Mich. Comp. Laws (1929),
§15716, which has been revised as Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1942), § 27.3178(442), provided for the liability of distributees and did not state any requirement that this claim
be filed or established. The present section does expressly say that the claim must be
"established as hereinbefore provided." However, one could infer that that requirement was to be implied in the earlier form of the statutes. But the court, in the case
referred to, said, 284 Mich. at 555: "All of the foregoing statutory provisions relate
to procedure in probate court and are predicated upon the estate's still being open for
the filing and presentation of claims."
1° Chewett v. Moran, (D.C. Mich. 1883) 17 F. 820; Allen v. Conklin, II2
Mich. 74, 70 N.W. 339 (1897); Rankin v. City of Big Rapids, (C.C.A. 6th, 1904)
133 F. 670. See also Lawrence v. De Boer, 273 Mich. 172, 262 N.W. 660 (1935).
11 N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act,§ 207 [as amended by N. Y. Laws (1941), c. 86] and
§ 208.
12 N.Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1939), §§ 170 to 183.
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in the real property." To hold heirs or devisees it must appear that
"one year has elapsed since the death of the decedent, and no letters
testamentary, or letters of administration, upon his estate, have been
granted within the state," or that eighteen months have elapsed since
letters were granted within the state. To recover against heirs, plaintiff
must show "That the deced~nt's assets, if any, within the state were
not sufficient to pay the plaintiff's debt, in addition to the expenses of
administration and debts of a prior class"; or "That the plaintiff has
been unable, or will be unable, with due diligence, to collect his debt
by proceedings in the proper surrogate's court, and, by action against
the executor or administrator, and against the surviving husband or
wife, legatees, and next of kin."
To recover against devisees it must, in addition, be shown that the
realty which descended to the heirs was insufficient to pay the debt or
that plaintiff has been and is unable to collect the debt against the heirs.
But for the fact that this discussion would be unduly prolonged, many
other jurisdictions could be added to this list of those which expressly
provide for a liability of distributees where no claim is filed. 73
From the foregoing statutory survey, it is apparent that legislation
on the subject under consideration has proceeded on two diametrically
opposite theories. On the one hand, we find a small group of states
which endeavor to make the distribution in probate absolutely final,
so that distributees can receive the property with the assurance that no
further debts of the decedent can be collected from them. On the
other hand, we find legislation in many states expressly designed to
'hold the distributee at any future date, however remote, to the extent
of his enrichment. It would seem, on the whole, that the first theory
is to be preferred. The death of a debtor is a risk which all creditors
should be expected to assume. And if their contingent claims are given
some protection by a retention of assets in the probate proceeding, that
is about alt they should expect. It. is true, the distributee is a mere
donee; but how can he ever expect to enjoy his gift, if the possibility
of an action for the debts of the decedent is forever hanging over him?
Doubtless, he could defend on the ground of change of position; but
would he always be able to prove that to the satisfaction of a court or
jury? The present Wisconsin statute which allows an action against
73 Ky. Civ. Code Pract. (Carroll-Baldwin, 1938), § 434; Ky. Stat. (CarrollBaldwin, 1930), §§ 2084-2089; Rev. Stat. (1942), §§ 396.060-396.080, 396.110;
Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 197, §§ 28-34; Mnn. Stat. (Mason's Supp., 1940),
§ 8992-107; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 10509-216 to § 10509-223, as
amended by 119 Ohio Laws, pp. 394-425; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940), §§
9-701 to 9-717; W. Va. Code (1937), §§ 4173, 4228.' This list does not purport
to be exhaustive.
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distributees on unmatured claims only if they have first been filed in
probate goes quite far enough in imposing a liability on distributees.
Legislation which has gone farther would seem to have been unduly
influenced by the viewpoint of early English law.
L. M. S.

